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Additional info for Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science
First, for Quine, ‘intelligibility’ and ‘clarity’ are (at least roughly) synonymous. ’ Carnap does not, as far as I could find, tie intelligibility to clarity. Second, for Quine, the standard of intelligibility is ultimate or fundamental: not only is it irreducible to ‘mere convenience,’ but it is not reducible to anything else either. A similar sentiment is expressed in Goodman and Quine’s “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism”: “Why do we refuse to admit the abstract objects that mathematics needs?
We can, of course, state a rule for any term, no matter what its degree of abstractness. . , to enable him to apply it to his observations in order to arrive at explanations and predictions. , a suitable part of everyday non-scientific English). g. g. an auto mechanic), and vice versa. To diverge momentarily from the main trajectory of this chapter, this text also points to an interesting historical fact about twentieth-century philosophy of science. The distinction that Carnap draws between ‘elementary’ and ‘abstract’ terms is virtually identical to the now-infamous distinction between the observational and theoretical vocabularies.
Most philosophers and logicians today, along with many of 25. For C hwistek , t he axio m of extensio n al i ty is: “ a ny two p roposi t io n al f u nct io ns t hat ag ree i n extensio n are iden t ical ” ( C hwistek 1935 / 1949, 133). 26. C hwistek ’s character izat io n of se m a n t ics is n o n-st a n dard: for h i m , se m a n t ics is “ t he st u dy of t he str uct u ral a n d co nstr uct io n al p roper t ies of exp ressio ns ( p r i m ar i ly of m at he m at ics) ” ( C hwistek 1935 / 1949, 83).